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The Casey Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on
Abortion Statutes

John Christopher Ford
INTRODUCTION

Since the Supreme Court declared in 1973 that the Constitution
grants women a limited right to an abortion,1 the Justices have de
cided abortion cases with reference to such weighty matters as reli
gious freedom,2 the disadvantaged position of women in society,3
and the proper role of the judiciary.4 Understandably, the Supreme
Court's writings on abortion deal extensively with these large
themes. The Court, and certainly others, view abortion cases as ri
valing Brown v. Board of Education5 in their importance to the na
tion.6 While the Court has focused on the big issues, however, it
has neglected an equally important, if less emotionally compelling,
one: namely, under what circumstances should a statute restricting
access to abortion be invalidated "on its face"?
A litigant can attack the constitutionality of a statute either "on
its face" or "as applied."7 The effect of a judicial decision depends
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 {1973). This Note takes the existence of the constitu
tional right to an abortion as a given. It takes no position on whether Roe and cases reaffirm
ing the right to an abortion are sound constitutional decisions, nor does it take any position
on the extent to which legislatures should attempt to restrict access to abortion, if any.
2. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 565-72 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reviewing the stance of the Roman Catholic
Church, particularly St. Thomas Aquinas, in finding the preamble to a Missouri abortion law
a violation of the Establishment Clause).
3. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-94 {1992) (plurality opinion)
{discussing spousal abuse statistics and sociological studies of women); Ohio v. Akron Ctr.
for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 {1990) (Akron II) {Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(calling for protection of minor women who are "frightened and forlorn, lacking the comfort
of loving parental guidance and mature advice." (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463
(1977))).
4. See, e.g., Akron II, 491 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Leaving this matter to
the political process is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically so. . . . The court should end
its disruptive intrusion into this field as soon as possible.").
5. 347 U.S. 483 {1954).
6. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 {1992) (stating that Brown and the abortion cases are
unique in that they called "the contending sides of a national controversy to end their na
tional division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution").
7. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
Ri::v. 235, 236 {1994). Attacks on the facial constitutionality of a state statute wind their way
to the Supreme Court by one of two avenues: on appeal from an anticipatory action in the
lower federal courts seeking to prevent enforcement of the statute, or on appeal from a state
case in which the statute was actually enforced. This Note deals almost exclusively with the
first category of cases, which are the most common in the abortion context. See, e.g., Hodg
son v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
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greatly on which type of challenge is brought to the Court.8 When
the Supreme Court declares a state statute unconstitutional as ap
plied to a particular defendant, the state cannot apply the statute to
the defendant's protected conduct. The state may, however, con
tinue enforcing the statute against all others.9 When the Supreme
Court upholds a facial challenge, however, enforcement must stop
altogether.to Successful facial challenges, in short, nullify a state
law.11
The standard by which to evaluate facial attacks on statutes that
restrict women's access to abortion services has become a momen
tous issue for a variety of reasons. First, facial challenges, rather
than as-applied challenges, are the norm in the abortion arena, as
physicians and interest groups such as Planned Parenthood regu
larly seek to have state statutes struck down in their entirety.12 Sec
ond, since Planned Parenthood v. Casey 's13 strong reaffirmation of
the existence of a constitutional right to an abortion in 1992, states
defending laws that restrict women's access to abortion increasingly
use the standard of review for facial attacks as a legal tool to pre8. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 236.
9. See Lawrence A. Alexander, ls There An Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN Drnoo L.
REV. 541, 542-43 (1985); Dorf, supra note 7, at 236. "As applied" challenges generally re
quire the court to determine whether or not a challenger's activity was constitutionally pro
tected. If so, the court interprets the law in a way that exonerates the challenger and in doing
so "trim[s] down" the law to its constitutional size. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITU·
TIONAL LAW 1192 (12th ed. 1991). This process is widely known as "severability."
10. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 236; Richard H. Fallon, Jr Making Sense of Overbreadth,
100 YALE L.J. 853. 853 (1991).
11. This is a slight overstatement. Because the Supreme Court does not have the power
to actually repeal state statutes, and because the meaning of state statutes is a matter of state
law, see, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992), state prosecutors theoreti
cally can seek new, constitutionally permissible interpretations of a statute even after the
Supreme Court has "struck down" a previous interpretation. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 491 (1964) (finding Louisiana's Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law
void on its face but stating that Louisiana could "assume the burden of obtaining a permissi
ble narrow construction in a noncriminal proceeding"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 489, 492-508 (1954). They rarely do this.
See Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa Baird, Con Law is as Con Law Does: A Survey of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 992 (1995)
("The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional 'on its face' is to render it com
pletely inoperative.").
When a federal court other than the Supreme Court finds a state law facially invalid, the
state does not even have to wait for a narrowing construction. Because the lower federal
courts stand parallel to and not above state courts, state prosecutors may continue to enforce
a statute in state court even after a lower federal court has found it facially invalid. See, e.g.,
Women's Servs., P.C. v. Douglas, 653 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that "a federal
plaintiffs [successful] constitutional attack
would benefit only that plaintiff: 'the State is
free to prosecute others who may violate the statute' " (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S.
922, 931 (1975))). Even in these situations, however, states very rarely continue to prosecute
violations of the statute. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 888 n.219.
12. See, e.g., Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Sinner, 819 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.D. 1993) (as
serting a facial attack to a North Dakota statute restricting abortion).
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
.•

.
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serve the operation of their laws. Prior to Casey, many states had
argued that Roe itself should be overturned.14 Third, by definition,
the standard for evaluating a facial attack determines how convinc
ing the facial challengers' showing of unconstitutionality must be in
order to win their case. Tue choice between a more or less strin
gent standard determines, in borderline cases, whether a constitu
tionally questionable statute will be struck down as a whole or
remain vital, subject only to as-applied challenges brought by ag
grieved individuals.is
Sensitive to the significant effect of facial invalidation generally,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno16 announced a test,
which this Note labels the "no-set-of-circumstances test," making it
nearly impossible to succeed on a facial attack. Without citing pre
cedent, the Salerno majority stated that "[a] facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of cir

cumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."17 Salerno
created - or perhaps merely recognized - a bifurcated structure
for evaluating facial attacks. On the first tier lie cases involving
First Amendment rights, in which the overbreadth standard con
trols facial attacks. Under the First Amendment overbreadth doc
trine, facial challengers succeed upon proof that a questioned
statute is capable of a "substantial number" of unconstitutional ap
plications.1s On the second tier rest all other facial attacks, and
they are governed by the no-set-of-circumstances test.19
The no-set-of-circumstances test has appropriately been called
"draconian" in effect, rendering it nearly impossible to succeed on a
facial challenge.20 This is especially true in the abortion context. If
the Supreme Court were faithful to Salerno, it would reject every
14. Casey held that a state can place a legislative ban on abortions after the point at
which a fetus becomes viable. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. Before viability, the state can
attempt to ensure that the woman's choice is informed, but it cannot place an undue burden
on that choice. See 505 U.S. at 878. An undue burden is a provision with the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. See 505
U.S. at 878.
15. See Planned Parenthood v.Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1454-57 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that
the choice between two facial standards "may well determine the outcome of this case").
16. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
17. 481 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added). Interestingly, this no-set-of-circumstances test was
not at all central to the holding of Salerno. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 240-41.
18. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1982).
19. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 ("The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate un
constitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it
wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment.").
20. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 239-40.
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facial attack on statutes restricting access to abortions.21 For in
stance, it would have to reject a facial challenge to a law declaring
all abortions illegal because the law could be applied constitution
ally to a woman who is eight months pregnant - that is, after all,
one circumstance in which a state undoubtedly has the constitu
tional authority to prohibit an abortion.22
The Court has not followed that course. It has never made pre
cisely clear, however, what standard it does use to evaluate the fa
cial attacks before it in the abortion context.23 Planned Parenthood
v. Casey muddied the waters even more. The plurality decision
used a standard of review markedly different from the no-set-of
circumstances test. In striking down Pennsylvania's husband
notification requirement24 - and without breathing a word of its
departure from Salemo - the plurality explained that the require
ment was facially invalid for the following reason: "[I]n a large
fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion."25
This test shows much less deference to statutes than the no-set-of
circumstances test. Instead of having to prove the unconstitutional
ity of every conceivable application of a statute, the Casey plaintiffs
only needed to show that a "large fraction" of applications would
infringe on constitutional rights in order to invalidate the statute's
provisions.26
21. This does not mean, of course, that the law would remain a valid restriction against all
women. It could only be narrowed, however, through as-applied challenges.
22. For instance, Guam passed a law preventing abortions unless two doctors indepen
dently confinn that the pregnancy poses a serious health risk to the woman. See Guam Socy.
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1368 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1011 (1992). Justice Scalia, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, argued that the
lower courts incorrectly upheld the facial challenge because the Guam law could be applied
constitutionally to the "set of circumstances" in which a woman in the post-viability stage of
her pregnancy sought an abortion. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecolo
gists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011-13 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). Scalia's analy
sis under Salerno is unquestionably correct because neither Roe nor Casey prevent the state
from prohibiting such late-tenn abortions. "If there is a flaw in [ Scalia's] argument, it lies
with Salerno itself." Dorf, supra note 7, at 238.
23. See infra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
24. The husband-notification requirement required a physician perfonning an abortion
on a married woman to obtain a signed statement from the woman declaring that she had
infonned her husband that she was going to have an abortion. Exceptions were provided in
cases of medical emergency, or where the woman provided an alternative signed statement
declaring that her husband did not impregnate her, that her husband could not be located,
that the pregnancy resulted from spousal sexual assault which she reported, or that notifying
the husband would cause him or someone else to inflict bodily hann on her. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992) (citing the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act
of 1982, 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 3209 (1990)).
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
26. Ironically, the break from Salerno came in an opinion which not only extolled the
virtues of stare decisis but adhered to that doctrine. In an appropriately described "act of
personal courage and constitutional principle," Casey, 505 U.S. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concur
ring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part), the members of the
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The various opinions in Casey dealt largely with the question of
whether to overrule Roe v. Wade. 27 They did not address at any
great length the standard for evaluating facial challenges, which
once again was relegated to sideline status in the most celebrated
legal debate of the late twentieth century.28
Casey left lower federal courts to face the difficult question of
whether Casey silently established a new standard of review for fa
cial attacks on statutes restricting abortions or whether the no-set
of-circumstances test applies to abortion cases. The federal courts
of appeals have come to divergent conclusions.29 In Barnes v.
Moore,30 the Fifth Circuit noted that Casey "may have applied" a
new standard, but ultimately followed Salemo.31 The Barnes court
further justified its decision by analogizing the statute at issue,
which it did not strike down, to parts of the Pennsylvania statute
found valid in Casey, 32 a technique which many courts adjudicating
facial challenges have used.33 In contrast, on remand, the Third
plurality rested their reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade on stare decisis despite a palpable distaste
for that decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 ("Roe
may be seen . . . as a rule (whether or
not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity."), 864 ("[A] decision to overrule
should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly
decided."), 869 ("A decision to overrule Roe[] . . . would address error, if error there was, at
the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy.").
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the plurality's inconsistency with Salerno in a footnote.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 973 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent
ing in part). Justice Blackmun likewise recognized, but did not elaborate on, the fact that the
plurality had used a novel test for facial attacks. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 924-25 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Those were
the only two comments on the rather striking development that seems to have occurred.
29. For an extended discussion of the confusion over the facial challenge standard, see
Tholen & Baird, supra note 11, at 1004-17 (1995). See also, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1457 (8th Cir. 1995).
30. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992).
31. See 970 F.2d at 14 n.2. The next two Fifth Circuit cases also followed Salerno. See
Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993); Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27
(5th Cir. 1992).
In Sojourner T., the court said only that "the plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of the
Statute. Thus, we must determine whether the plaintiffs are correct that the Statute cannot
be construed and applied without infringing upon constitutionally protected rights." So
journer T., 974 F.2d at 30 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991)). The court, in
striking the restrictive Jaw, reached the wrong result under Salerno. The statute prohibited
all abortions except those necessary to preserve the life or health of the unborn baby, to
remove the dead unborn child, to save the life of the mother, or when conception occurred
by rape or incest. The statute could be applied, however. with no constitutional infirmity to a
healthy woman carrying a viable fetus that was not the product of rape or incest.
32. See Barnes, 970 F.2d at 14-15 ("[W]e conclude that the differences between the Mis
sissippi and Pennsylvania Acts are not sufficient to render the former unconstitutional on its
face.").
33. See Tholen & Baird, supra note 11, at 1011-12, 1021-22. For examples of this ap
proach, see Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 530 (8th Cir. 1994); Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992), affd. in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 61
F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
. . •
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Circuit found that Casey set a new standard.34 The Eighth Circuit,
after initially avoiding the issue, also found that Casey "effectively
overruled Salemo for facial challenges to abortion statutes."35 At
the Supreme Court level, two of Casey's three-member plurality,
Justices O'Connor and Souter, have stated that Casey overruled Sa
lerno,36 while Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, in contrast, have stated
that Salerno should control abortion cases.37
This Note argues that Planned Parenthood v. Casey established
a new standard for facial attacks on abortion laws and that it is the
correct one to apply to any facial attack on state statutes that alleg
edly infringe on the constitutional right to have an abortion. Part I
of this Note argues that the Casey test is in harmony with previous
abortion decisions, and that these decisions have drawn heavily on
the overbreadth doctrine used to adjudicate facial challenges based
on the First Amendment. Part I then demonstrates why the theo
retical justifications for the overbreadth doctrine suggest that it
should be applied to abortion cases as well. Part II explains how a
judicial analysis under the new Casey standard should proceed. It
concludes that the Casey test's emphasis on the factual record
makes it superior to current First Amendment overbreadth juris
prudence for use in abortion cases.
I.

0VERBREADTH DOCTRINE IS MORE APPROPRIATE FOR
AB ORTION CASES THAN THE SALERNO No SET OF
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
-

-



Overbreadth, like obscenity, undoubtedly exists but is very diffi
cult to define.38 Most can agree on at least this much: the over
breadth doctrine allows a litigant to challenge the constitutionality
of a statute, regardless of whether the litigant's own conduct is con
stitutionally protected, on the basis that the statute prohibits other
persons' protected conduct.39 This type of analysis is an exception
to the often-invoked rule that "a person to whom a statute may
constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the
34. See

Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994).

35. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1458 (8th Cir. 1995).
36. See Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (O'Connor, J., concurring in order denying application for
stay and injunction pending appeal).
37. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011-13
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
38. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 542 ("The most notable fact about the [overbreadth]
doctrine . . . is that what it is and what justifies it remain the subjects of controversy and
confusion.").
39. See id. at541-42;see also, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
.
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ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others in situations not before the Court."40
For instance, in one overbreadth case, a defendant was charged
under a Houston ordinance making it a crime to "interrupt any po
liceman in the execution of his duty."41 The defendant had at
tempted to distract some police officers from arresting his friends.42
Despite the fact that his own activity may very well not have been
protected under the First Amendment, his overbreadth claim suc
ceeded, and the ordinance was struck down on its face, because the
ordinance could have applied to the protected speech of other peo
ple not before the court.43 For example, a person who calmly utters
a political statement might inadvertently "interrupt" a policeman,
although that person's speech undoubtedly could not become the
basis for a prosecution as it is clearly protected by the First
Amendment.
It is true, of course, that the Salerno test for facial challenges the no-set-of-circumstances test - allows a litigant to attack a law
based on factual situations not immediately before the Court. The
challenger is asked to prove, after all, that every conceivable appli
cation of the law will be unconstitutional. The no-set-of
circumstances test, however, differs from overbreadth in two vital
respects. First, the overbreadth standard does not require proof
that every application not before the court will be unconstitutional.
It merely requires a showing that some significant number of un
constitutional applications will result. Second, because of the all
embracing nature of the no-set-of-circumstances test, a litigant
40. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1982) (citations omitted) ("What has come
to be known as the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is one of the few exceptions to
this principle . . . . "); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Henry P.
Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 277, 278 n.8 (1984) (citing cases). This
rule derives from the presumption that any invalid application of a law may be "severed"
from its valid applications.
It is also important to note that despite this prudential rule, the Article III-based standing
requirement permits the Court to hear any case in which a litigant has a "personal stake" in
the outcome. See Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third
Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 394 (1981)
(citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 123 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499500 (1975)). Thus, while a criminal defendant has standing to challenge a law she is prose
cuted under, the prudential rule may prohibit that defendant from raising the constitutional
concerns of other parties not before the court. See generally Note, Standing to Assert Consti
tutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423 (1974). This Note does not address the possible
"personal stake," or constitutional-level standing problems, which arise when a group such as
Planned Parenthood challenges a law. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Singleton,
428 U.S. at 112, 123; PAU L M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 123-25 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disin
tegration of Article Ill, 14 CAL. L. REv. 1915 (1986).
41. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 455 (1987) (citing HousToN, True, CoDE § 34-ll(a)
(1984)).
42 . See Hill, 482 U.S. at 453.
43. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 458-67.
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making a challenge under it would have to show that even her own
activity was constitutionally protected. Thus, if the defendant
above were to make a challenge based on the no-set-of-circum
stances test, he would have been required to argue that even his
own act of disrupting the policeman to save his friends was pro
tected by the First Amendment. Thus, the no-set-of-circumstances
test does not proceed, as overbreadth analysis does, without regard
to the challenger's actions.
This Part explains that the Casey plurality used an overbreadth
theory, rather than the no-set-of-circumstances test, and that it was
right to do so.44 Section I.A reviews Supreme Court abortion juris
prudence, including Casey, and concludes that an unarticulated
overbreadth theory has, in fact, been used all along. The Casey
standard, therefore, is consistent with, not a departure from, the
Court's treatment of abortion cases. Section I.B examines the two
theories said to underlie the overbreadth doctrine and shows that
each of the theories indicates that overbreadth analysis should ex
tend to the abortion context.
A.

The Sup reme Court Has in Fact Applied Overbreadth to
Abortion Cases

Despite statements to the contrary,45 the Court has used the
overbreadth doctrine in abortion cases both before and after the
development of the no-set-of-circumstances test in Salerno. In Roe,
the plaintiff brought a facial attack against a Texas statute criminal
izing most abortions.46 After enunciating the trimester framework
for analyzing restrictions on a woman's right to have an abortion,47
the Roe majority appealed to the overbreadth doctrine:
Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code,
in restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by med
ical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps

44. Although this section will refer to overbreadth as if it were one well-defined doctrine,
in actuality there are many possible formulations. In Part II, this Note will argue that the
formulation voiced in Casey is preferable to the current First Amendment overbreadth stan
dard. See infra notes 110-43.
45. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990) (stating that overbreadth is exclu
sively a First Amendment concept).
46. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973). Roe held (i) that during approximately
the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision must be left to the pregnant woman
and her physician, (ii) that after the first trimester, the state may regulate abortion proce
dures in ways reasonably related to its interest in the health of the mother, and (iii) that after
the point of viability, approximately simultaneous with the start of the third trimester, the
state may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary to preserve the life
or health of the woman. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
47. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
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. . The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitu
tional attack made upon it here.48
.

Similarly, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 49 the Court used a chilling-effect rationale - which, as
noted below, derives from the overbreadth doctrine5o - to strike
down provisions of an Ohio abortion statute. The majority stated
that Ohio's requirement that all abortions after the first trimester
take place in a hospital had "the effect of inhibiting . . . the vast
majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks."51 Akron found it
important that a "vast majority" of unconstitutional applications
would occur - it did not demand that every contemplated abortion
after the first twelve weeks be inhibited.
In addition to Akron and Roe, other abortion cases arising
before Salerno also used the overbreadth rationale.52 If the Court
had been using a Salerno no-set-of-circumstances test in these cases,
it would have been forced to uphold the statutes. Even the most
restrictive abortion laws, after all, can be applied constitutionally to
a woman in the post-viability stage of her pregnancy and not facing
a grave threat to her health.53 Indeed, the use of overbreadth anal48. 410 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added); see also Ada v. Guam Secy. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 505 U.S. 1011, 1012 (1992) ( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("The
Court's first opinion in the abortion area, Roe v. Wade, seemingly employed an 'overbreadth'
approach - though without mentioning the term and without analysis." (citation omitted)).
Lower court decisions on the same issue that pre-dated Roe also employed overbreadth anal
ysis. See Roe, 410 U.S.at 154-55 (citing Abele v.Markle, 342 F. Supp.800 (D. Conn.1972);
Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp.224 (D.Conn.1972); Doe v.Bolton, 319 F. Supp.1048 (N.D.
Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S.179 (1973); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp.1385 (N.D.Ill.
1971); Poe v.Menghini, 339 F. Supp.986 (D.Kan.1972); YWCA v.Kugler, 342 F. Supp.1048
(D.N.J. 1972); Babbitz v.McCann, 310 F. Supp.293 (E.D.Wis.1970); People v.Belous, 458
P.2d 194 (Cal.1969); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972)).
49. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
50. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
51. Akron, 462 U.S. at 438 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79
(1976)).
52. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 763, 769 (1986) (noting effect of state-distributed literature on rape victims without stat
ing that any plaintiff was impregnated through rape and finding the statute that called for the
distribution facially invalid); Bellotti v.Baird, 443 U.S.622, 632 (1979) (quoting lower court's
characterization of the case as an overbreadth issue); Collauti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.379, 385,
390 (1979) (not reaching the "overbreadth" claim); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71 (following Roe
and using the chilling-effect rationale); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973) (explicitly
using overbreadth analysis); cf. Singleton v.Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-18 (1976) (noting that
chilling effect justifies granting physicians jus tertii to assert the rights of patients). But see
H.L. v.Matheson, 450 U.S.398, 405-07 (1981) (considering only the as-applied challenge of
an immature minor and refusing to rule on the statute's impact on mature minors). Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmon and Brennan, dissented in Matheson, declaring that
the Court should have ruled the law overbroad. See Matheson, 450 U.S.at 427 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
53. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S.1011, 1011-12
(1992) ( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
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ysis in abortion cases prior to Salerno is nearly indisputable.s4 As
with the sun's daily rising, some, like the tired farmhand, may la
ment it,55 others, like the rooster, relish it,56 and others simply ac
cept it.57 Very few indeed deny it.ss
Strangely, the establishment of the Salerno test did not signifi
cantly reduce the Supreme Court's use of overbreadth analysis in
abortion cases. Justice O'Connor first invoked the no-set-of
circumstances rule in a concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services.59 While her Salerno analysis was analytically
sound, the argument was largely ignored.6o Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, responded in a footnote
without explaining his reasons for rejecting the apparently good
law, stating simply "I disagree" with this approach.61 Salerno grad
uated to a plurality opinion in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproduc
tive Health (Akron 11).62 In Akron II, however, Salerno was used
54. See Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1347 n.10 {5th Cir. 1993) (Johnson, J,, dis
senting); Fallon, supra note 10, at 859.
55. See, e.g., Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011-13 ( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
56. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 539-41 {1989) {Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Missouri statute establishing beginning of life at conception will
have chilling effect on those seeking abortion).
57. See Webster, 492 U.S.at 560 { Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he record identifies a suffi
cient number of unconstitutional applications to support the Court of Appeals' judgment
invalidating those provisions.").
58. Justice O'Connor is the only member of the court to have done this. In Webster, she
noted the possibility that the statute in question could conceivably limit the use of certain
forms of contraception in a manner unconstitutional under Gris wold. O'Connor believed,
however, that "all of these intimations of unconstitutionality are simply too hypothetical to
support the use of declaratory judgement procedures and injunctive remedies in this case."
Webster, 492 U.S. at 523 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
"Maher, Poelker, and McRae stand for the proposition that some quite straightforward appli
cations of the Missouri ban ... would be constitutional and that is enough to defeat appel
lees' assertion that the ban is facially unconstitutional." Webster, 492 U.S. at 524 {O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The cases O'Connor cites all uphold
government restrictions on abortion funding. In none of them, however, does the Court note
even one possible unconstitutional application of the statutes. Thus, in those cases, the Court
never had to decide whether to use overbreadth or a Salerno-type standard. See Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S.297 {1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.464 {1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519
{1977).
59. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
60. The neglect of the Salerno rule is particularly troubling in Webster, an abortion case
unique in its lengthy argument over whether the Court should have reached the abortion
issue at all. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 520-21 {plurality), 523-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment), 532-37 ( Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment), 542, 554 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 560-61
( Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Webster, 492 U.S. at 539 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990) ("In addition, because appellees are making a facial chal
lenge to a statute, they must show that 'no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid.'" (quoting Webster, 492 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))).
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merely as makeweight; discussion of the rule did not extend one full
paragraph.63 The Salerno rule continued its ascent in Rust v. Sulli
van, 64 which involved a facial attack on federal regulations restrict
ing a bortion counselling. The Court cited the no-set-of
circumstances standard at the beginning of its discussion, and re
mained aware throughout the opinion of the case's status as a facial
attack.65 Despite these few mentions of Salerno, the Court contin
ued to employ overbreadth analysis in its abortion decisions, even if
it did not explicitly admit to doing so.66
The Casey decision, rather than sweeping the issue under the
rug, however, as other cases might be said to have done, laid out a
new standard that draws on overbreadth principles. The distin
guishing characteristic of overbreadth analysis, as noted above, is
that it allows litigants to challenge a law, regardless of what their
own (actual or contemplated) behavior is, on the basis that the law
will unconstitutionally restrict some significant number of persons
not before the court. Accordingly, Casey upheld the challengers'
argument against the husband-notification provision based on its
conclusion that the requirement would act as an unconstitutional
burden on a large fraction of women.67 In order to uphold the fa63. See Akron II, 497 U. S. at 514.
64. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
65. Interestingly, Rust contains at least one sign that the Court may have been ready to
temper the Salerno test, perhaps in order to be able to apply it more regularly without mak
ing a radical change in the Court's approach to abortion cases. Rust declares that the regula
tions survive the facial challenge because they can be applied to "a set of individuals without
infringing upon constitutionally protected rights." Rust, 500 U. S. at 183. It may have been in
the mind of the Court that the "set of individuals" test - a phrase susceptible to later refine
ment - could be crafted to Jess "draconian" effect than the no-set-of-circumstances test,
which upholds a Jaw capable of being applied to only one person constitutionally.
66. See Belloti v.Baird, 443 U. S. at 627 n.5 (stating that "[i]t is apparent from the District
Court's opinions, however, that it considered the constitutionality of [the abortion statute] as
applied to all pregnant minors who might be affected by it," and accepting that "the rights of
this entire category of minors properly were subject to adjudication" even though no imma
ture minors were before the court). In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417 (1990), the Court
found no legitimate state interest served by a two-parent notification provision as applied to
families in which one notified parent would not notify the other. See Hodgson, 497 U. S. at
450. It also found legitimate state interests disserved in the case of dysfunctional families.
See Hodgson, 497 U.S.at 450-51. The Court, however, as well as the district court below, did
not establish that any of the plaintiffs came from dysfunctional families or families in which a
notified parent would not notify the other. See Hodgson, 497 U. S. 417; Hodgson v. Minne
sota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 759 (D. Minn. 1986). Rather, the Court based its conclusion of uncon
stitutionality on the effect the Jaw was having on the general population, and made no
attempt to relate those findings back to the plaintiff class. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 437-39.
The district court likewise failed to do so. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768.
67. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 276 ("The Casey plurality thus applied 'substantial over
breadth' analysis."). In some cases, courts will allow a party to assert the rights of one partic
ular person not before the court, such as his medical patient, without entertaining an
overbreadth argument in which the party can point to the effect that a statute will have on
virtually anyone. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-18 (1976) (allowing a physician to
assert the rights of his patient); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (allowing a white
seller of land to assert the constitutional rights of a prospective African-American buyer).
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cial attack under the no-set-of-circumstances test, the plurality
would have needed to conclude that the notification provision
amounted to an unconstitutional barrier for all women, which it ex
plicitly refused to do.6s
While the historical use of overbreadth analysis in abortion
cases is fairly clear, a resurgent force has discovered the discrepancy
between Salerno and Casey and asserts that the Salerno standard
should control.69 A cynic might declare that some judges are using
the nearly impossible to satisfy Salerno test as a tool - a kind of
last-ditch measure - to preserve the enforceability of new abortion
laws which violate the undue-burden standard.70 Whatever the rea
son, a new dispute has emerged.

B.

Overbreadth Theory Supports its Use in Abortion Cases

Although most agree that the overbreadth doctrine exists, the
justifications offered for the doctrine are conflicting at best and sim
ply not understood at worst.71 This section briefly summarizes the
two primary justifications and demonstrates their consistency with
the thesis advanced here - that some form of overbreadth analysis
This is called standing to assertjus tertiL See BATOR ET AL., supra note 40, at 169-70. Though
this conceivably may have occurred in Casey, none of the adjudicating courts required the
clinics or their physicians to prove that the husband-notification provision would operate as a
restriction on any of their patients. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.833 (1992)
(plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
68. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (accepting respondents' argument that ninety-five percent
of married women notify their husbands voluntarily).
69. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992)
( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Barnes v.Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992); Jane
L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992), affd. in part, reversed in part on other
grounds, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
70. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("More than
one commentator has noted that the causation component of the Court's standing inquiry is
not more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the underlying claim.").
At least in one instance, a Justice's position on the Salerno-Casey debate seems to be self
contradictory. Justice Scalia, who now believes Salerno calls for a restrained approach to
adjudication of abortion laws, see Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011-13 (citing United States v. Salemo,
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)), once declared in the same context that the court should not "be
run into a comer before . . . grudgingly yield(ing] up our judgment." Webster v. Reproduc
tive Health Servs., 492 U. S. 490, 535 (1989) ( Scalia, J., concurring). In that case, Justice
Scalia argued - at a time when the overturning of Roe seemed eminently possible - for a
reconsideration of abortion law in light of the fact that Missouri's abortion statute would
"sometimes" act as an unconstitutional restraint on physicians. Webster, 492 U. S. at 536-37.
After Casey, however, which has somewhat solidified Roe, Justice Scalia has stated that the
fact that a law will sometimes operate unconstitutionally is not a reason to entertain a facial
challenge. See Ada, 506 U. S. at 1011-13 ( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
71. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 9, at 542 ("The most notable fact about the [over
breadth] doctrine, however, is that what it is and what justifies it remain the subjects of
controversy and confusion."); Fallon, supra note 10, at 853 ("More than fifty years after its
inception, First Amendment overbreadth doctrine remains little understood. " (citation
omitted)).
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should be applied to abortion cases. Section I.B.1 explains why the
"third-party-standing" rationale supports the extension of over
breadth analysis to the abortion context, and section I.B.2 does the
same for the "valid-rule-of-law" theory.
1.

The "Third-Party-Standing" Theory Requires Extension to
Laws Infringing Abortion Rights and Beyond

The overbreadth doctrine, according to some, allows litigants
"third-party standing" - an opportunity to assert the rights of hy
pothetical persons not before the court.72 This view finds ample
authority to support it in the Supreme Court's regular characteriza
tion of the overbreadth doctrine as a unique standing rule.73
Writers and judges justify the standing rule as being necessary to
protected against a theorized, and dreaded, "chilling effect."74 To
illustrate with an actual - albeit extreme - case, a chilling effect
would occur if a ban on "all First Amendment activity" at the Los
Angeles airp ort caused some travelers to forgo wearing shirts em
blazoned with political messages or to forgo engaging in other ex
pression protected by the First Amendment at the airport. Because
these people never break the rule in the first place, they are never
prosecuted, and courts never hear the constitutional arguments that
the chilled parties would make against the law.75 The standing
component of the overbreadth doctrine vindicates the constitu
tional claims of these people by allowing other litigants to raise
them.76
72. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1023 (2nd ed.
1988); David S. Bogen, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 Mn. L. REV. 679, 705
(1978); Fallon, supra note 10 at 867-70; Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amend
ment: Unra veling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1978). This type of third
party standing can be distinguished from j us tertii, standing to assert the rights of identifiable
third parties.
73. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 555 (1993) ("The 'overbreadth'
doctrine . . . is a departure from traditional rules of standing."); Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S.601, 612 (1973) ("[T]he court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit - in
the First Amendment area - 'attacks on overly broad statutes ... . ").
74. See generally Schauer, supra note 72.
75. The chilling effect has most poetically been analogized to the sword which Dionysus
hung by a single hair over legendary courtier Damocles' head to demonstrate the precarious
nature of happiness. See JUDY PEARSALL & BILL TRUMBLE EDS., THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPE
DIC DrcnoNARY (2d ed. 1995). Like the chilling effect, "the value of a Sword of Damocles is
that it hangs - not that it drops." Arnett v.Kennedy, 416 U.S.134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
76. This line of reasoning can be found in several cases. See, e.g., Gooding v.Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); see also Schauer, supra note 72, at 685 ("[T)he concept of the
chilling effect has grown from an emotive argument into a major substantive component of
First Amendment adjudication....[T)he potential deterrent effect of a vague, or more com'
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It is hard to believe that restrictive abortion laws do not have a
chilling effect which is equal to, if not greater than, restrictive
speech laws.77 Typically, women seek the aid of a doctor when at
tempting to obtain an abortion. The clinics that women visit per
form abortions on a regular basis;78 therefore, those institutions are
likely to be well-informed of state abortion law. Thus, if a woman
seeking an abortion does not initially know of the restrictions her
state places on abortions, she will meet with people whose aid is
vital to the implementation of her decision, who will require that
she comply with state restrictions on abortion.79 The abortion pro
cedure all but ensures that the chilling effect will be very icy when
directed toward women seeking to have an abortion.8° Further
more, because of the emotional nature of the abortion debate, the
media heavily cover the passage of restrictive abortion laws, making
it likely that pregnant women will have some knowledge of the
state law that applies to them.
Even those women who are undeterred by knowledge of the law
may be chilled from asserting their rights as a result of the brevity
of the gestation period.Bl A woman's constitutional right to an
abortion lasts less than six months; a lawsuit can last much longer.
That is, by the time a woman becomes pregnant - and, therefore,
has an incentive to go to court to vindicate her rights - she may
well feel it is already too late to redress the infringement on her
rights.
This subsection confronts three major arguments for limiting
chilling-effect theory to First Amendment cases.82 The first argumonly, an overbroad statute, was seen as reason enough to bend traditional rules of stand
ing." (citation omitted)).
77. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 40, at 188 (questioning the limitation of the chilling
effect rationale to the First Amendment area).
78. See THE NEW OuR BODIES, OURSELVES 299 (Jane Pineus & Wendy Sanford eds., 2d
ed. 1984) (noting that most first-trimester abortions are performed in clinics with a focus on
abortion).
79. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (suit brought after doctor insisted that
minor woman comply with parental-notification law).
80. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 271 (noting that the introduction of third parties increases
the susceptibility of a woman to the chilling effect). A woman who forgoes a visit to the
doctor out of fear that her constitutionally permissible abortion is illegal has already felt the
chill.
The preceding discussion vindicates one scholar's prophecy that "it is not far-fetched to
imagine that there are many cases in which those whose conduct is most subject to chill will
number among those who are most knowledgeable about decisional as well as statutory law. "
Fallon, supra note 10, at 887. This assertion derived from the logical thought that the extent
of public awareness of any given state statute depends on the nature of the statute. Id. at 885.
81. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
82. The fact that chilling-effect theory applies outside of the First Amendment context
has been contemplated by other authorities. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 884 n.192 ("Much
of my argument concerning the proper contours of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine
would support a doctrine of equal sweep in cases involving alleged infringements of other
fundamental rights.").
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ment against the expansion of chilling-effect theory is that it
wrongly assumes citizens know the content of the laws on the
books.83 Though persuasive, this criticism applies to First Amend
ment cases more so than abortion cases. The paragraphs above ex
plain why a woman is virtually certain to become aware of the
content of state law regarding abortion restrictions. In contrast,
when a state passes a law abridging free speech, it may receive
some media attention, but no governmental or private agent will
inform a speaker of the law just as the speaker is about to open her
mouth. Nor will an agent always be around to enforce compliance
with the law, as occurs in the abortion context, by silencing the
speaker just at the moment she decides to utter her constitutionally
protected remarks.
The second argument against extension of the �hilling-effect
theory can be stated simply: Because overbreadth, is "strong
medicine,"84 the judiciary should use it sparingly and in small
doses.85 If this argument is valid, it can only justify heightening the
standard for successful overbreadth challenges across the board.86
It cannot rightly be used to discriminate between constitutional
rights unless one right is more important than others.87
83. See id. at 885; Martin H.Redish, The Warren Court, The Burger Court and the First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.1031, at 1040-41 (1984); Note, Over
breadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532, 546 (1974). This argument,
very persuasive in this form, holds even more weight in the case of a statute that has been
saved from an overbreadth challenge by a limiting construction placed on it by state courts
because citizens are not at all likely to possess any knowledge of state judicial decisions. See
Fallon, supra note 10, at 885.
84. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). This therapeutic metaphor has
captured the imagination of courts and commentators alike. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S.103, 122 (1990) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S.at 613); New York v.Ferber, 458 U.S.747,
769 (1982) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613); Redish, supra note 83, at 1040 (quoting
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613). Efforts to deviate from it have not succeeded. See Goguen v.
Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 97 (1st Cir.1972) ("[O]verbreadth technique is a powerful weapon which
... should be applied gingerly.").
85. A similar argument, which suffers identical problems, is that the overbreadth doctrine
causes federal courts to exceed their proper authority. See Younger v.Harris, 401 U.S.37, 52
(1971) ("Procedures for testing the constitutionality of a statute 'on its face' ... are funda
mentally at odds with the function of the federal courts in our constitutional plan.").
86. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 ("[W]e have recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is
'strong medicine' and have employed it with hesitation, and then 'only as a last resort.' We
have, in consequence, insisted that the overbreadth be 'substantial' before the statute involved
will be invalidated on its face.'' (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
87. One could, of course, suggest the First Amendment be our stopping point out of
simple fear of the slippery slope. It is true that the argument made here with regard to
abortion rights could be extended to any other fundamental right embodied in the Four
teenth Amendment - for example, the right to use contraception. This Note does not ad
dress those cases. It should alleviate the fears of the wary to note that, in this context, the
slope, while perhaps steep, is very short. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 269 (arguing that over
breadth, at its extreme, would extend only to First Amendment rights and privacy rights).
Admittedly, this issue has already come up in "right to die" cases, see People v. Kevor
kian, 447 Mich. 436, 467-68 n.33 (1995) (noting that the choice between Salerno and Casey
must be made if the right to die is recognized); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d
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This leads directly to the third argument for limiting over
breadth to the First Amendment context: the right of free expres
sion is indeed a "preferred" right and therefore deserves the
greatest protection.ss While the preeminence of the First Amend
ment is often asserted without much discussion,s9 those assertions
do not justify limiting overbreadth analysis to the First Amendment
context. One argument regarding the pre-eminence of the First
Amendment states that a deprivation of the right of expression
works an injustice to an entire community that fails to hear censored
speech, while deprivation of other individual rights merely damages
the individual concemed.90 The premise of this argument is flawed.
Often, a citizen exercises his right of free speech before an ex
tremely limited audience, and often there is no audience at all.91
Likewise, and more importantly, when a government deprives a
person of the right to an abortion, many people may be affected.
Consider, for instance, an indigent, single woman who desires an
abortion so that she might better provide for her already-born chil
dren. If she is prevented from having an abortion - whatever one
may think of that decision - her children and other family mem
bers, her boyfriend, employer, and possibly state and federal relief
programs, among others, would all be significantly affected. Even
assuming a community-wide effect of free speech deprivation and
an individual effect of other deprivations, however, the conclusion
that, therefore, expression rights deserve special protection does
not easily follow. The rights in the First and Fourteenth Amend
ments are individual rights.92 Thus, their importance to the con586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply Salerno), as well as Establishment Clause cases, see
Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School District, 864 F. Supp. 1473, 1483 ( S.D. Miss. 1994)
(holding that "the rigid dictates of Salerno do not apply in Establishment Clause cases,"
which are covered by the three-part Lemon test); Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,
741 F. Supp. 1386, 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (choosing to apply the Lemon test rather than
Salerno). Under the Lemon test, a statute violates the Establishment Clause if it (i) does not
have a secular purpose, (ii) if its principal or primary effect is to inhibit religion, or (iii) if it
fosters an " 'excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1974)).
88. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509 {1946) ("When we balance the Constitu
tional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and
religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred
position."); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 115 (1943) (mentioning the preferred
position of freedoms of press, speech, and religion); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852 (1970) ("[P]referred status is the ultimate rationale of
the overbreadth doctrine . . . . ").
89. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 10, at 884 n.192. But see a discussion of this issue in the
very informative article, Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J.
464 (1956).
90. See Note, Inseparability in Application of Statutes Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1208, 1209 (1948).
91. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 {1969) (holding that the First Amendment pro
tects the private possession of obscene material).
92. See GUNlHER, supra note 9, at lxvi-lxvii.
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cemed individuals is a better yardstick by which to judge their
significance than the ripple effect on a community when those
rights are denied.93 On that individual level, it is safe to say that, at
any given time, a woman may consider her right to an abortion
more important than her right to free speech.94
A second justification given for the preeminence of expression
rights is that laws abridging rights other than those found in the
First Amendment may give impetus to a movement to change the
unjust law, while a law impairing free speech "restricts the
processes by which the law is altered."95 Admitting that this state
ment will be true in some rare cases - for instance, if a law re
stricted political rallies at the state capital building - it is most
often not true. Consider Jews for Jesus, 96 in which First Amend
ment activity at the Los Angeles airport was banned. The invali
dated law did not prevent the Jews for Jesus organization from
protesting the airport restrictions at City Hall, or obtaining signa
tures for a petition against it, or for voting for a politician who
promised to fight to repeal the restriction.
While the preeminence of the First Amendment might not jus
tify restricting overbreadth analysis to the First Amendment, one
alternatively might argue that overbreadth analysis should not be
used in abortion cases because the abortion right is of particularly
small consequence. Indeed, statements in judicial decisions leave
room to believe that the right to choose to have an abortion is of
less moment than any other fundamental right. For instance, even
Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe, characterizes the abortion
right as "limited. "97 Furthermore, states are permitted to express a
preference for childbirth rather than abortion.9s The foregoing
might be considered a principled basis for not extending over93. See Cahn, supra note 89, at 479 (arguing against the practice of balancing free speech
rights against the interest of the community). If the community benefit of an individual's
speech ranks as highly as this argument suggests, it is unclear why a state could not compel
speech of certain individuals that is of particular benefit to the community. We know, how
ever, that the recognized right not to speak, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.v.Barnette, 319 U.S.624 (1943), inter alia, would render the
compulsion invalid. But see Schauer, supra note 72, at 691 (arguing that speech is unique in
that the courts actually think of it as an affirmative good); LEE C.BoLUNGER, THE TOLER
ANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ExrnEMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 9-10, 107 (1986)
(stating that free speech theory has traditionally focused on the value of the speech, not its
importance to an individual).
94. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 265 (citing Planned Parenthood v.Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857
(1992)).
95. Note, supra note 90, at 1209.
96. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Commrs., 661 F. Supp. 1223 (C.D. Cal. 1985),
affd., 785 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1986), affd., 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
97. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.490, 555 (1989) (Blackmun, J., con
curring in part and dissenting in part).
98. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 504-07.
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breadth analysis to abortion cases. But the fact that states can indi
cate a preference for childbirth does not make the abortion right
any different from the right of free expression; the state, after all,
can express a preference for certain forms of speech, such as speech
promoting democracy, in its funding decisions.99 Also, references
to abortion as a limited right merely recognize that it must be
weighed against the fetus's right to life. This, too, is no different
from the First Amendment context, in which the right to free
speech must be balanced against the rights of the community.mo
Even if First Amendment rights are to be considered most im
portant, or abortion rights least important, neither view justifies
limiting the overbreadth doctrine to First Amendment jurispru
dence. Here, unlike cases that have spawned announcements of the
"preferred position" of the First Amendment, the First Amend
ment is not being pitted against another right such as the abortion
right.101 Extending overbreadth analysis to abortion laws does not
denigrate the First Amendment in any way; it merely recognizes
that rights found within the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause need to be safeguarded as well.
2.

The "Valid-Rule-of-Law" Theory Also Requires Extension to
Abortion Cases

Tue valid-rule-of-law theory, an alternative justification for
overbreadth analysis, is the "third-party-standing" theory's only
major competitor. Valid-rule-of-law theory insists that the over
breadth doctrine has no relation to standing rules at au.102 As its
name suggests, it begins with the premise that all litigants have the
right to be judged by a valid rule of law.103 It further notes that
some constitutional rules of law, but not others, make the validity
99. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 509.
100. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1063-65 {2d ed.
1991) (reviewing the balancing approach to the First Amendment); see also Jerold H. Israel,
Elfbrandt v.Russell: The Demise ofthe Oath?, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 217-19 (stating that
the overbreadth doctrine applies when the governmental interest sought to be implemented
is too insubstantial, or at least insufficient in relation to the inhibitory effect on First Amend
ment freedom).
101. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 {1946) (holding that free speech rights
have preeminence over property rights); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (same).
102. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 39 {"In sum, over
breadth analysis is concerned with the substance of constitutional review; it does not rely on
any distinctive standing component."); Monaghan, supra note 40, at 283. For a modified
version of Monaghan's approach, see Robert Allen Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional
Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 10 CAL. L. REV. 1308 {1982). But see Robert Allen
Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599
{1962) (arguing that in overbreadth doctrine cases, the Supreme Court allows parties to as
sert the rights of others). Monaghan's approach has been labeled an "attempt to discredit"
overbreadth analysis. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 542.
103. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 102, at 3.
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of statutes dependent on whether they apply constitutionally to
people other than the litigant. For instance, state legislatures must
use the least restrictive means possible when restricting protected
speech.104 One of the most convincing ways for a litigant to prove
that the legislature did not use the least restrictive means possible is
to demonstrate that the statute would prohibit the speech of a great
number of people. Of course, these people will not be parties to
the action in which the litigant makes this claim. According to the
valid-rule-of-law theory, then, it is the constitutional rule of law at
issue - here, the least-restrictive-means test - that makes it possi
ble for the litigant to show that parties not before the court will be
adversely affected, and not a special standing rule.105 If she can do
so convincingly, she will have proved that the law is rotten at its
core and, therefore, incapable of sustaining her conviction.
In most instances, the applicable law does not make cases
outside the court relevant to the validity of the law; after all, most
government regulations are not subjected to a least-restrictive
means test. For that majority of cases, impermissible applications
are chipped away only through as-applied challenges.106 But when
ever the rule of law requires a significant connection between the
means and the ends of the statute, overbreadth analysis should be
used: "This congruence requirement is of central importance not
only in the First Amendment context but wherever any standard of
review other than the rational basis test is mandated by the applica
ble substantive constitutional law. Overbreadth challenges are,
therefore, not confined to First Amendment adjudication." 107
While Casey established a standard that does not match the
rigor of strict scrutiny,1os the undue-burden standard requires more
104. See id.
105. "Judicial conclusions of overbreadth or of the availability of less restrictive alterna
tives are equivalents. They are simply different statements that other, more finely tuned
means exist to vindicate any presumably valid state policies." Id. at 38 n.157 (citations omit
ted). But see National Treasury Employees v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (arguing that the number of invalid applications required by overbreadth analysis
is probably greater than the number of invalid applications required under the least
restrictive-means test, thus suggesting a difference between the two).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U. S.17, 22 (1960); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Monaghan, supra note 102, at 4.
107. Monaghan, supra note 102, at 4; see also Redish, supra note 83, at 1034 (arguing that
it is surely correct that the overbreadth doctrine applies outside the First Amendment
context).
108. Justice Scalia noted that the deferential undue-burden standard tolerates direct reg
ulation of protected activity to a greater degree than the strict scrutiny test. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 988 (1992) ( Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Possibly anticipating its expansion to other contexts, Justice Scalia
called the undue-burden standard "quite dangerous." Casey, 505 U. S. at 988 ( Scalia, J., con
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun also asserted that
application of strict scrutiny would have required the Court to strike down provisions which
were upheld. See Casey, 505 U.S.at 932-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. City of Akron v.
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than mere rationality and certainly requires adoption of less restric
tive alternatives in some cases.109 The valid-rule-of-law theory,
then, holds that overbreadth challenges may quite correctly be
brought against restrictive abortion laws, whether or not the com
plaining party has engaged in protected activity. The challenger
would only have to show that, in some cases, the restrictions will
operate as an undue burden. The availability of less restrictive
means, if proven, would demonstrate that the law is invalid and de
mand victory for the challenger.
II.

CASEYS LARGE-FRACTION TE ST I S THE MO ST APPROPRIATE
FORM OF 0VERBREADTH ANALY SI S FOR ABORTION
CA SE S

Above, this Note defined overbreadth analysis as a doctrine
which allows challengers to invalidate a law, regardless of the chal
lenger's own activity, on the basis that some significant number of
other people will be unconstitutionally restricted by the law. This
definition leaves many questions unanswered, such as how many
persons' protected conduct need be infringed before a court will
declare a law unconstitutional, how convincing the challenger's
proof of this infringement must be, and the like. Because these
questions can be answered in a variety of ways, overbreadth analy
sis can take on many different forms.110 In its First Amendment
cases - purportedly the only context in which overbreadth chal
lenges are allowed111 - the Supreme Court has developed particu
lar answers to those questions. This Note will refer to the more
general theory as simply "overbreadth analysis," and the particular
First Amendment formulation as "Broadrick overbreadth analysis,"
after the case that formulated it.112
While this Note has argued that facial challenges to restrictive
abortion statutes should be, and have been, measured by an over
breadth standard rather than the Salerno standard, it remains to be
considered exactly what species of overbreadth analysis should be
employed in such cases.113 Broadrick overbreadth analysis invaliAkron Ctr.for Reproductive Health, Inc., 426 U.S.416, 463 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the undue-burden analysis does indeed use strict scrutiny, but only after a
threshold determination that the statute in question constitutes an undue burden).
109. But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 988-90 ( Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulty in de
fining a "due" burden).
110. Cf. Fallon, supra note 10, at 868 n.94 ("I do think it implausible, or at least mislead
ing, to claim that the Constitution requires exactly the overbreadth doctrine that we have
now, or indeed an overbreadth doctrine defined by any specific set of doctrinal rules.").
111. See, e.g., United States v.Raines, 362 U.S.17, 21 (1960).
112. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1972).
113. There is more than one possible formulation of the overbreadth doctrine. See supra
note 44 and accompanying text; cf. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768 n.21 ("Overbreadth challenges are
only one type of facial attack.").
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dates statutes capable of a substantial number of impermissible ap
plications judged in relation to the statute's sweep.114 The Casey
overbreadth standard - invalidating statutes which operate uncon
stitutionally in a large fraction of the relevant cases - is but an
alternative formulation of the overbreadth doctrine. This section
explains how an analysis under the Casey standard should proceed.
In doing so, it concludes that the careful attention to facts required
under the Casey standard suggests that it is superior to Broadrick
overbreadth analysis for use in abortion cases.
The Casey standard invalidates statutes that operate unconstitu
tionally in a "large fraction" of the cases in which they are "rele
vant. "115 Admittedly, the course of a proper review under this
standard is less than self-evident. The three controlling principles
of the test, however, can provide a basis for consistent and judicious
application of a Casey standard of overbreadth analysis. Section
II.A describes the first guiding principle of Casey, an attempt to
discover the actual effect that a challenged statute is having, or will
have, in our society. Section II.B lays out the second (and related)
principle, the Casey test's exclusive focus on those people whose
conduct the statute may influence. Third, as section II.C explains,
although the plurality used mathematical language in referring to a
large fraction of cases, the test does not strive for scientific preci
sion. Judges who give due respect to these principles may fashion a
coherent body of abortion law which protects the abortion right up
held in Casey while correcting for problems associated with
Broadrick overbreadth analysis.
A.

The Factual Record Should Be Extremely Important to a
Court Applying the Casey Test

In order to determine whether the Pennsylvania statute at issue
would operate unconstitutionally in a large fraction of the cases in
which it was relevant, the Casey plurality exhaustively reviewed fac
tual data regarding spousal abuse and other sociological studies, ul
timately concluding that a husband-notification provision would
seriously affect the decision of some women to choose an abor
tion.116 While some have attributed the lengthy factual review to
114. New York v.Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615;
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.280, 309 n.61 (1981) (arguing that overbreadth challenges may not be
made by those whose conduct falls into the "hard core" of the protected area). For a history
of the overbreadth doctrine, see Fallon, supra note 10, at 863-64; Redish, supra note 83, at
1031.
115. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (plurality opinion).
116. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-92. The Supreme Court was actually reviewing the Dis
trict Court's 387 findings of fact. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F.Supp.1323, 132972 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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the nature of the undue-burden test,117 the very nature of the large
fraction test also demands intense attention to facts.
For an illustration, assume that the Supreme Court decided that
Pennsylvania's twenty-four hour waiting period acted as an undue
burden on one specific group: poor women who must travel far to
obtain an abortion.11s If Utah thereafter passed a restrictive abor
tion law with an identical twenty-four hour waiting period require
ment, and a facial attack was brought against it, precedent would
obviate the need for courts to determine whether the statute places
an undue burden on poor women who must travel far to get an
abortion in Utah.
Nonetheless, if the Casey standard for facial attacks were em
ployed, those challenging the Utah statute on its face would still
have to show that it acts as an unconstitutional restriction in a large
fraction of the cases in which it is relevant.119 They could do this
most effectively by entering (what would be favorable) factual evi
dence regarding the economic circumstance of women in Utah who
seek abortions (impoverished), the costs of abortion in Utah (high),
and the location of abortion providers in Utah (few and far be
tween). These facts best answer the question before the Court:
Will the provision often operate unconstitutionally in practice in
Utah? Under the Casey standard, unlike Broadrick overbreadth
analysis, it is not enough for a party or judge to hypothesize a "sub
stantial" number of women who, on account of their financial con
dition, will be burdened by the waiting period. A judge must
instead determine how many of those women really exist, and what
fraction of the abortion-seeking population that would not other-

117. They are not incorrect to do so; the undue-burden test does in fact require courts to
entertain the elusive, fact-based question of whether a law places a "substantial obstacle" in
front of a woman who has chosen to undergo an abortion procedure. See Tholen & Baird,
supra note 11, at 980.
118. The Court noted that it was a "close[ ] question" whether the 24-hour waiting period
placed an undue burden on those women who must travel far to obtain an abortion, those
who face increased exposure to harassment by anti-abortion protesters, those with the fewest
financial resources, and those who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands,
employers, or others. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86. A more developed factual record may
yet persuade the Court that a 24-hour waiting period acts as an undue burden towards some
women. See Casey, 505 U. S. at 887 ("[O]n the record before us
we are not convinced that
the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden." (emphasis added)). But see Dorf,
supra note 7, at 276 (incorrectly stating that the Court found the 24-hour waiting provision to
be an undue burden towards rural and poor women, but not a large enough number of
women to justify facial invalidation).
119. See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993); Casey, 505
U.S. at 895. Of course, in the case of an as-applied challenge, a Utah court would only need
ask whether the woman before it is poor.
• • •

·
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wise wait twenty-four hours they represent.120 The best way to do
that is by a review of reliable statistics.121
Thus, the Casey standard requires courts to concern themselves
with the peculiarities of geography,122 job setting,123 and other per
tinent circumstances surrounding any allegedly unconstitutional
statute's operation.124 The fact that the economic condition of
women varies from state to state means that a finding on the consti
tutionality vel non of identical statutes might not carry over from
one state to the next under the large-fraction test.12s Courts adopt
ing the Casey standard have often foregone a state-specific factual
analysis, however, for the much easier, though incorrect, method of
using Casey's judgment on particular Pennsylvania provisions as a
dispositive judgment of the overbreadth of another state's analo
gous restrictions.126
Of course, the above should not be taken to mean that the con
tours of the right to an abortion vary across states under the Casey
test. Rather, the class of persons towards whom the statute acts
unconstitutionally - a group whose characteristics are uniform
120. To understand why abortion-seeking women who would not otherwise wait 24 hours
are the denominator of the Casey fraction, see infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
121. See Schafer, 113 S.Ct.at 1669 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of stay and injunc
tion pending appeal) (noting that the Casey large-fraction standard requires a review of the
facts). The reliability of statistics, of course, will be hotly litigated in a court using the Casey
standard.
122. The small number of abortion clinics in a given state might, for example, make a
statutory 24-hour waiting period burdensome to a greater number of women in that state
than in Pennsylvania. Therefore, lower courts have been misguided in analogizing to the
provisions upheld in Casey without looking at the realities of life in the forum state.
123. A ban on political activity by government employees may be particularly "chilling"
if, for instance, the supervisors of those employees informally enforce the ban. In such a
situation, see, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S.601, 617-18 (1972), the state employees
are likely to be deterred from "speaking," and unlikely ever to raise First Amendment con
cerns in a defense to a state prosecution.
124. See supra note 80. The fact that a woman must consult an informed doctor and
medical staff before obtaining an abortion suggests that restrictive statutes will "chill" the
exercise of her right.
125. For a discussion of the disparity of abortion availability across states and counties,
see Donald P. Judges, Taking Ca re Seriously: Relati onal Feminism, Sexual Difference, and
Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1323, 1470-75 (1995).
126. See Judges, supra note 125, at 1454 n.447; Tholen & Baird, supra note 11, at 1003;
Valerie J.Pacer, Note, Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard - ls It a Lost Ca use? The Undue
Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 309 n.94 (1994).
Plaintiffs in a case challenging a restrictive Mississippi abortion statute apparently recognized
that the Casey overbreadth standard required a state-specific factual inquiry. The plaintiffs
unwisely chose to use some down-home language in making their correct argument:
In their post-Casey supplemental brief, plaintiffs reduce their argument to the amor
phism "Mississippi ain't Pennsylvania[,]"[ ] stating, "The record in this case proves what
all know empirically: Mississippi ain't Pennsylvania." This speaks volumes about the
invalidity of their challenge to the Mississippi Act on its face; in fact, no more really
need be said.
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992). The court here was perhaps too angry
to get the law right.
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throughout the nation - simply might be so large in one particular
state, and -so dubious in another, that the interest in protecting par
ties not before the court can justify the extreme remedy of facial
invalidation in only the first case. In the other, that interest is not
of sufficient volume to outweigh the government's interest in en
forcing its law against those who are not protected.121

Casey's focus on the actual number of unconstitutional applica
tions that will arise differs from Broadrick overbreadth analysis,
which allows parties and courts to base a constitutional conclusion
on hypothetical situations. This difference arises from the fact that
Broadrick overbreadth analysis deals with applications which a stat
ute is "capable of," realistic or not, while the Casey standard deals
with the actual "operation" of a law.12s Admittedly, some over
breadth opinions attempt to ground their analysis in reality.129
Nonetheless, the Court continues to posit hypotheticals without
empirical basis,130 and no overbreadth analysis has gone into the
factual detail that Casey did.
Intense factual review may place a certain tax on judicial econ
omy. It may also cause courts to dispute the validity of statistics
among themselves in a way more suited to a legislature than a judi
ciary.131 Nonetheless, a reliance on available facts should calm a
sometimes-voiced fear about the overbreadth doctrine: it is "too
abstract."132 Few complaints of abstractness will be heard from
those who have waded through the 387 factual findings in Casey. 133
127. Of course, even the notion that the extent of a specific person's constitutional pro
tection depends on where she lives is not foreign to the Constitution. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 {1973) (making obscenity exception to the First Amendment dependent, inter
a/ia, on community standards).
128. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-95 (1992) {plurality opinion).
129. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 n.6 (1987) (noting that although evi·
dence regarding the actual application and enforcement of the law is not necessary for facial
invalidation, such evidence has been found to be probative of the law's potential for uncon
stitutional application, that is, probative of its overbreadth) (cited in Rachel N. Pine, The
Role ofFacts in Judicial Protection ofFundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 699 n.192
(1988)); Hodell v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 723-25 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting the
use of hypotheticals); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
801 (1983) (stating that plaintiffs must demonstrate a realistic danger that the challenged
ordinance would compromise First Amendment freedoms).
130. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-11 (1993).
131. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 224 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he legis
lature is not required to prove before a court that its statistics are perfect.").
132. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 861. Despite this fear, Professor Fallon accepts over
breadth analysis in First Amendment cases. He does not explain, or even argue, how over
breadth is any less abstract in the First Amendment context than others. Instead, he makes a
judgment, not thoroughly explained, that abstractness is sufferable when First Amendment
rights are involved because those are the most important. See id. at 884 n.192.
133. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1329-72 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
Moreover, the Court has been more concerned with tying its findings to the facts of the world
in other areas of the law. When deciding whether a "rational basis" supports a statute, the
Justices often speculate on the hypothetical rational basis a legislature might have had for
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Of course, it is possible to imagine situations in which reliable
statistics are not available. For instance, a future challenger might
claim that materials provided by the state to women choosing to
have an abortion were so graphic and disturbing that they created
an undue burden on the right to have an abortion for a large frac
tion of relevant women. In that case, statistics probably could not
capture accurately the number of women who faced an undue bur
den, as that estimate would rely so heavily on mental processes.
Likewise, certain statistics - such as those regarding instances of
'
rape - may be inherently unreliable.
The plurality, unfortunately, gives no direction on what to do
when statistics prove unhelpful. Justice Blackmun proposed a sen
sible solution to this problem by noting that the Casey overbreadth
test should be made with reference to expert testimony, empirical
studies, and common sense.134 The Court should simply use its own
understanding of the world as a guide in determining whether the
statute will operate unconstitutionally in a large fraction of cases.
Where statistics are unhelpful, therefore, the analysis of abortion
cases should closely resemble Broadrick overbreadth doctrine, the
First Amendment analysis that does not require a close attention to
factual investigation. This approach, however, should be used only
as a last resort.
B.

The Large Fraction Standard Requires an Exclusive Focus on
Relevant Cases

The second, and most important, principle of Casey overbreadth
analysis is an extension of the first. The standard demands not only
a focus on the actual effect of a statute, it demands attention to the
challenged statute's effect on a specific group of people: those who

desire to engage in protected activity proscribed by the particular
provision being tested, or, in other words, those whose conduct will
passing certain legislation rather than consider its actual purpose. The Court very nearly
accepted the argument that when conducting this inquiry, which it does quite often, it should
look to find the actual basis rather than a posited one. See GuNTiiER, supra note 9, at 621
n.9. The argument for a focus on the legislature's articulated purpose was posed in Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer E qual Protection, 86 HARV.L. REv. 1 (1972). Some
members of the Court accepted the "real world" focus outright, see GuNTHER, supra note 9,
at 621 n.9, and others balked, presumably only out of the fear of imposing requirements on
the legislative body, see id. In the overbreadth area, by contrast, a concern with facts does
not saddle state legislatures with additional responsibilities, and thereby result in an unwise
intrusion into the legislative realm. See United States R.R.Retirement Bd.v.Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 179 (1980) ("It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact
underlay the legislative decision,' because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." (citation omitted)).
134. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 925 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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actually be changed by the existence of the law.135 That is, the de
nominator of the large fraction must be ascertained. Defining this
group has proved troublesome.136
In Casey, the Court emphati�ally rejected Pennsylvania's argu
ment that the husband notification provision passed the large
fraction test because the great majority of pregnant women volun
tarily notify their husbands of their desire to have an abortion. It
was willing to accept that only one percent of women seeking abor
tions would not notify their husbands voluntarily. The Court noted,
however, that:

'

The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom
the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for con
sistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it
affects. For example, we would not say that a law which requires a
newspaper to print a candidate's reply to an unfavorable editorial is
valid on its face because most newspapers would adopt the policy
even absent the law. The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the
law is irrelevant.131

Thus, in the Utah example above, a court could not find the statute
constitutional because poor women are a small fraction of all
women in Utah and, thus, do not constitute a large fraction of the
cases. The group restricted by the law is those women who, absent
the law, would not have waited twenty-four hours for an abortion.
A court, therefore, must ask what percentage of women who would
not otherwise wait twenty-four hours before getting an abortion suf
fer an undue burden because of their poverty. After shifting its fo
cus, a court may well find that poor women make up a large
fraction of those who are restricted.138
It is here that the Casey standard makes its great departure from
standard overbreadth analysis. Casey asks simply: Will this statute
prevent citizens who desire to act in protected ways from doing so?
The way Casey gets right to this question, indeed the great virtue of
the Casey test, lies in its immediate removal of the irrelevant cases
- those cases in which the chilling effect has no conceivable chance
to operate.
In contrast to Casey, Broadrick overbreadth analysis uses the
entire population regulated by the challenged statute as its frame of
reference. The number of impermissible applications is to be
135. See 505 U.S. at 894-95.
136. See, e.g., Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1489 (D. Utah
1994).
137. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
138. It may be, for instance, that those with enough money to do so tend to see a doctor
more than once before having an abortion, thus independently creating a 24-hour waiting
period.
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judged in relation to the statute's entire sweep. Using this formula
tion of overbreadth analysis, Pennsylvania's husband-notification
provision would not have been struck down. While Casey logically
looked first to those who might be chilled, Broadrick overbreadth
analysis looks first to all pregnant married women; any woman with
a husband, after all, is within the sweep of the husband-notification
provision. Ninety-five percent of married women notify their hus
bands voluntarily,139 thus, the challenge would have failed under

Broadrick.
The major fl.aw with this approach is that it allows the statute's
sweep - which may have little connection to the amount of chilling
taking place - to control the analysis. For example, assume Penn
sylvania passes a criminal statute regulating one million people. As
a result, 5000 people change their behavior to conform with the law;
most were in compliance with it already. Of the 5000 who altered
their behavior, 4800 ceased engaging in constitutionally protected
activity; the conduct of the other 200 was not protected. By most
measures, 4800 is not a large number when compared to one mil
lion. Thus, a challenge under Broadrick would fail. Nonetheless,
the chilling effect in this case worked nearly to the limit. The Casey
standard recognizes this by using the group of 5000 - the group
that was actually chilled - as the starting point of the analysis. By
any measure, 4800 over 5000 is a large fraction. This, of course,
leads to the next question: Precisely what is a large fraction?

C.

The Large Fraction Test Cannot Be Performed With
Mathematical Accuracy

If the plurality believed that their reference to a large fraction of
cases demanded scientifically precise analysis, Justice Rehnquist
would have been right to criticize it as he did:
The joint opinion concentrates on the situations involving battered
women and unreported spousal assault, and assumes, without any
support in the record, that these instances constitute a "large frac
tion" of those cases in which women prefer not to notify their hus
bands . . . . This assumption is not based on any hard evidence,
however. And were it helpful to an attempt to reach a desired result,
one could just as easily assume that the battered women situations
form 100 percent of the cases where women desire not to notify, or
that they constitute only 20 percent of those cases .140

This passage mistakenly implies a kind of mathematical exactitude
to the term "large fraction." Any overbreadth theory will have a
high-water mark that, when exceeded, signals a constitutional viola139. See Casey, 505 U.S.at 894.
140. Casey, 505 U.S.at 973-74 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist called for the continued vitality of Salerno. See Casey,
505 U. S. at 972-73.

1470

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 95:1443

tion.141 Just because we can only estimate the water level at any
given time, and that it cannot be measured with certainty, is irrele
vant.142 Certainly, the elusive nature of that inquiry has not
stopped the Court from applying it in First Amendment cases. The
Casey standard recognizes the inherent imprecision and corrects it
as much as possible, that is, by forcing judges to justify their deci
sions with proven factual circumstances whenever possible. Indeed,
despite the dissent's remarks, the Casey plurality did base its find
ings on hard evidence.143
CONCL U SION

With Roe, the Supreme Court became the nation's primary arbi
ter of abortion rights.144 Subsequent Supreme Court opinions
mapped a rocky rather than smooth course, suggesting the Court
141. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 40, at 193 (noting the speculative nature of the over
breadth inquiry); Fallon, supra note 10, at 893 {"The hard question, nonnatively as well as
doctrinally, is how the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth ought to be gauged."); see also
C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NomE DAME L. REV.
862, 907 {1985) (noting the empirical nature of the overbreadth inquiry and the Burger
Court's failure to determine to what extent a judgment on overbreadth should be qualitative
or quantitative). On the question of what number of unconstitutional applications is "sub
stantial, " see National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1274-75
(D.C.Cir.1993) (arguing that the number of invalid applications required is probably greater
than the number of invalid applications required under the least-restrictive-means test); Red
ish, supra note 83, at 1064 (stating that the substantiality requirement is satisfied if a majority
of applications are unconstitutional), see also Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796
F.2d 1547, 1563-66 (7th Cir.1986) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (discussing the relation between the
two standards).
142. Another commentator has perhaps said it best:
[W]hile it is true that there are behavioral assumptions that provide the basis for chilling
effect analysis, the lack of any ability to quantify or test these assumptions does not
diminish the significance of the chilling effect as a substantive doctrine. The doctrine
flows from the relationship between our recognition of the inevitability of error and our
preference for a particular type of error; and it is the existence of this relationship, rather
than the scientific accuracy of the predictions of human behavior, which justifies the
fonnulation of substantive rules in this area.
Schauer, supra note 72, at 688-89.
143. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 891-93 (citing AMA COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, VIO
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN (1991); Nancy M. Shields & Christine R. Hanneke, Battered Wives
Reactions to Marital Rape, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE
RESEARCH 131, 144 (David Finkelhor et al.eds., 1983); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME 27-28 (1984); Tracy Bennet Herbert et al., Coping with an Abusive Rela·
tionship: I. How and Why do Women Stay?, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 311 (1991); B.E.
Aguirre, Why Do They Return? Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 J. NATL. AssN. Soc.WORKERS
350, 352 {1985)); James A.Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among Spouses in the
United States, 1976-85, 19 AM. J. Pun.HEALTii 595 (1989); Domestic Violence: Terrorism in
the Home: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the
Senate Comm on Labor and Human Resources, lOlst Cong.3 (1990); Barbara Ryan & Eric
Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal Notification and Marital Interaction,
51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 41, 44 (1989).
144. See Webster v.Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.490, 535 (1988) ( Scalia, J., con
curring). Roe in fact generated, more than it built upon, the national abortion controversy.
See Earl M.Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 27
(1992).
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might nullify the abortion right at any moment.145 Our nation, ever
watchful of the federal courts' abortion decisions - and driven to a
fever pitch by the emotional nature of the debate - would cer
tainly find any case disposed of based on the standard for evaluat
ing facial attacks anticlimactic. Nonetheless, that issue is,
analytically speaking, central to the abortion cases. The standard
determines how "active" the federal courts will be in striking down
overly restrictive state statutes146 - an issue just as important, if
less absorbing, than the litany of other concerns that abortion cases
raise. Since Casey, a decision which has momentarily solidified the
Court's position on abortion rights, it has become an even more
important argument for those who wish to preserve the facial valid
ity of laws restricting access to abortion.
Overbreadth analysis has been applied in abortion cases, and
should continue to be applied in the form of the Casey test. Besides
its harmony with prior decisions, use of the large-fraction test ac
knowledges that restrictive abortion statutes hang like a sword, chil
ling behavior that has been declared constitutionally protected regardless of the fact that "some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morality."147 The alterna
tive Salerno no-set-of-circumstances test lays to the side. In the
abortion context, that standard is impossible to meet, and, there
fore, can be used as camouflage reasoning that denies the abortion
right in fact while preserving it in theory. Furthermore, the Salerno
test finds no pedigree in Supreme Court decisions on abortion. It
has no place in an area of the law where personal inclinations al
ready threaten to dominate.
145. See Walter Dellinger & Gene Sperline, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Re
treat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83 (1989) (noting the imperilled status of the
right to an abortion).
146. See M. Chester Nolte, Invalid for Vagueness or Overbreadth: Challenging Prohibi
tions of Protected Speech, 30 WEST'S Enuc. LAW REP. 1017-18 (suggesting that the over
breadth standard is a question of judicial activism).
147. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.

